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Abstract
In the paper, we use the theory of mechanism design to exhibit the cost of efficient
provision of healthcare, defined as the uniquely defined sum of individual side payments
which would eliminate moral hazard. It is argued that this cost may be used to assess
the costs arising from use of the treatment in cases where it is not appropriate from a
strictly medical point of view. An example is given to indicate how this assessment
might enter into practical cost-effectiveness analysis.
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1. Introduction
The increasing awareness of the cost of healthcare has led to the introduction of
economic tools in decisions about treatments to be offered and reimbursement of patients’
outlays. As a result of practical needs as well as theoretical considerations, a discipline
of health economic assessments has developed, documented not only in numerous journal
articles but also in textbooks such as Drummond et al. (1997), Drummond and McGuire
(2001).
The basic tool for health economic assessment has always been the search for a cost-
effectiveness ratio of a given treatment or medicine, and in recent years, the standard way
of presenting results here is in the form of cost per QALY achieved. Much effort has been
laid down in the development of methods for measuring QALY weights of health states,
with the ultimate goal of presenting the decision maker with the best possible way of
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utilizing the funds available for health care. The very terminology suggests that choosing
the treatment with the lowest cost-effectiveness ratio implies that the maximal gain in
health will be achieved; the decision is the most effective to be bought for the money
available.
In the present paper we shall argue that even if we agree both on the objective
of achieving effectiveness (maximum of health for the given amount of money) and
accept the QALY approach as a valid measurement of health (a viewpoint which has
went almost unchallenged for surprisingly many years, but where critical voices are
now appearing), there can be no effectiveness without efficiency, in the sense that the
interventions chosen should be applied to the right patients. Even if we accept the validity
of QALY measurement, this efficiency aspect is not taken care of in a standard cost-
effectiveness analysis.
What is missing in the standard approach is the behaviour of the patient and the
prescribing doctor when the drug (or in general, the medical intervention) has been accepted
as part of what is offered in the healthcare system. In this situation we may encounter
overuse caused either by favorable reimbursement rates or simply by patient preferences
for the new treatment, or underuse, again either by the provider’s reluctance to use it or
by patients’ substitution towards cheaper though less effective drugs. This phenomenon is
often referred to in practice as diagnosis drift, meaning that the drug is applied beyond its
original designation, and decision makers are worried about it when deciding on marketing
and reimbursement, but since it is not readily quantifiable and definitely not supported by
any clinical data, it is rarely taken into account.
From the point of view of health economics, diagnosis drift is an instance of moral
hazard, where individuals strive to achieve the best possible treatment given that their true
state of health is only partially observable to the healthcare organization delivering the
treatment. As is well-known, the phenomenon is not easily done away with, and the point
of the present investigation is not to find ways of countering moral hazard, but rather to
see whether there is a natural measure of the amount of moral hazard activity connected
with a given treatment, which might be incorporated in the cost-effectiveness analysis of
this treatment as a particular inefficiency cost.
We look at a somewhat simplified world, where QALY measurement is universally
available and valid, so that even patients assess their health gain from any treatment in
terms of QALY. This is clearly not a realistic assumption, but, given the almost unanimous
acceptance of QALY measurement in the profession today, not an unusual one. Patients are
not identical, and their treatment needs differ, but the healthcare system has as its objective
to provide as much health gain to the population as possible, an objective which in our
simplified world means that it aims at maximizing the total QALY gain of the population.
A situation where total health needs are met in such a way is efficient, and without explicit
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mentioning this seems to be the generally shared objective of contemporary healthcare
systems.
Due to the presence of moral hazard, the healthcare system faces an information
problem. Telling the truth is not necessarily in the interest of the patient (if some overdoing
of the subjective symptoms can result in a preferred or cheaper treatment), and with
biased information, the efficiency is endangered. In practice, what most concerns the
decision makers seem to be the additional cost to the system which is caused by possible
misrepresentation, but from an overall point of view the main problem is that naive methods
of collecting information may fail.
This is a typical problem of mechanism design, and indeed our setup is such that
we may apply some of the important results from the theory of mechanism design to our
problem. We show that the information problem can indeed be done away with if we
are willing to include side payments, either from the healthcare organization or from the
patients.
2. The model; assessing the cost of efficiency in treatment
We consider a community with N individuals, interpreted as potential patients. We
assume that patients’ health states belong to a set H , the structure of which will be
specified later, except for the detail that it contains a distinguished element denoted h0 and
interpreted as “full health”. A health profile is an array h = (h1, . . . , hN ) specifying the
health state of each individual. The community has a healthcare organization which may
provide treatments t ∈ T to individuals; we assume that also T contains a distinguished
element 0 interpreted as “no treatment”. A treatment plan is an element of TN , where for
t = (t1, . . . , tN ) ∈ TN , the ith coordinate specifies the treatment of individual i. The
gain in terms of health-related quality of life obtained by individual i in health state h
obtaining treatment t is denoted Qi(t, h). We assume that Qi(t, h0) = 0 for any treatment
t: treatment has no effect on patients in perfect health. An example of a utility indicator
of this form is the QALY gain from treatment t at health state h.
Assume that the healthcare provider has limited capacity, so that the treatment plan
must belong to a given subset B of TN . In the traditional approach to cost-effectiveness
analysis, the set B is all the alternative possibilities of treating the population for different
illnesses that can be financed with the budget which is available to the decision maker
who represents the healthcare system. If treatments are provided under the criterion of
bringing maximal benefit to as many individuals as possible, an optimal treatment plan
tˆ(h) given the type profile h is one which gives highest aggregate utility to the population,
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that is satisfies
tˆ(h) ∈ argmax(t1,...,tN )∈B
N∑
i=1
Q(ti, hi). (1)
In the case where QALY measures give a faithful picture of health-related quality of life, so
that each individual has utility function Q(t, h), the above method of choosing treatment
plan is the utilitarian decision rule (society’s choice maximizes the sum of the individual
utilities).
As argued in the preceding section, systems of healthcare provision are susceptible to
moral hazard, in the sense that patients might want a treatment which increases personal
satisfaction but does not represent the best possible way of utilizing limited resources. In
the context of our model, it means that individuals will select their messages concerning
health state in such a way that the resulting treatment plan is as good as possible for
themselves. This has the unfortunate side-effect of distorting the decision which no longer
necessarily represents the optimal treatment plan given the true health profile h.
Since moral hazard in our present setup takes the form of misrepresentation of types
hi by patients, it seems reasonable to consider methods for obtaining truthful revelation.
The most obvious candidate here is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, in
which the statements of type give rise not only to an allocation (namely the treatment plan
given by (1)) but also to a system of (user) payments from each of the individuals. For
the VCG mechanism to work properly, we shall assume that the utility of each individual,
depending on type (health), treatment, and money outlays, is quasi-linear, taking the form
u(ti, hi, pi) = Q(ti, hi)− pi.
The VCG mechanism then consists of the allocation part as specified in (1), using the type
statements (not necessarily truthful) of the individuals, and the payment part, whereby
individual i pays
pi(h) =
∑
j =i
Q(tˆ j(h0, h−i), hj)−
∑
j =i
Q(tˆ j(h), hj) + gi(h−i), (2)
gi being an arbitrary function depending only on the types stated by the individuals different
from i. Since the functions gi are not otherwise specified, there is a whole family of VCG
mechanisms available.
We may now exploit the classical following results from the theory of mechanism
design:
Proposition 1. (a) In the mechanism specified by (1) and (2), it is a weakly dominant
strategy for each individual i to state the true health state.
(b) If the set H of health states is a convex subset of Rd for some d, then any
mechanism such that truth is a weakly dominant strategy for each individual is a VCG
mechanism.
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Part (a) of Proposition 1 was established by Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), and part
(b) is due to Green and Laffont (1977) and Holmstro¨m (1979). Proof of the proposition
can be found in many texts, e.g. in Milgrom (2004), so we omit it here.
It may be instructive to consider the payment formula somewhat closer, choosing
the simplest version with the functions gi being identically 0, the so-called pivot VCG
mechanism. In this case, what is demanded from i as user payment is the difference
between the aggregate health gain to be obtained by the others if individual i has no need
of treatment whatsoever, and the health gains obtainable for the others if also individual
i must be treated. Using a terminology which is well-known among health economists,
we have that i must cover the opportunity cost of her own treatment, measured in health
gains. It should be noticed that this opportunity cost, measured as the health gain that all
other patients lose when a given patient is treated, will typically be smaller than the full
cost of treatment.
It seems reasonable to measure the cost of efficiency, at least in the context of a
particular chosen mechanism for attaining it, as the sum of the payments by individuals.
We shall use the terminology society’s efficiency cost for this measure. Assuming that
patients reporting the state h0 corresponding to full health and who will not change the
treatment profile t by their presence, will pay 0, this efficiency cost (considered on a per
potential patient basis) will be
csoc(hi, h−i) =
∑
j =i
Q(tˆ j(h0, h−i), hj)−
∑
j =i
Q(tˆ j(h), hj).
Taking expectation over the distribution of health states of the remaining individuals, given
the health state hi of individual i, we get the expected payment of i in health state hi,
csoc(hi) = E [csoc(hi, h˜−i)]; (3)
Finally, taking expectation over health states of patients with hi = h0 we get
Csoc = E [csoc(hi)|hi = h0]
as an assessment of the per patient cost of achieving efficient allocation of treatments. It
should be emphasized that this cost is not related to treatment of patients (as the direct
costs) nor to patients’ functioning in production or consumption (as indirect cost). They
are purely theoretical in the sense that these costs would have been incurred if patient
treatment was to be efficient, which in practice it is not. Thus, these are virtual costs of
misallocation, the cost that would be incurred if misallocation was to be set right. We
shall return in a later section to a discussion of this somewhat exotic type of cost and their
possible role in cost-effectiveness analysis.
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What may rightly be objected at this point is that in the approach to efficient allocation,
we have insisted on a particular mechanism, or rather, in view of Proposition 1(b), on a
particular solution concept, namely equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strategies, meaning
that truthful reporting is as good as any other report no matter what the other individuals
report, and better in some cases. We might settle down with a mechanism which achieves
efficient allocation of treatment using a less demanding equilibrium concept, and this might
change our assessment of the efficiency cost. We shall see in the next section that this is
not the case.
3. Independence of the assessment
The reliance on a particular mechanism, namely the VCG mechanism, for achieving
efficient treatment, might seem a weakness of the approach, so we should consider possible
alternatives. Also, the particular property of the VCG mechanism that truthtelling is
weakly dominant may conceivably lead to higher than necessary user payments. We
therefore consider an arbitrary mechanisms M = (S, τ, π), where S is an abstract space
of messages, τ : SN → TN an outcome map which assigns a treatment plan to each array
of messages, and π : SN → RN a payment function specifying the payment for each
individual given the messages sent by all individuals.
A Bayesian equilibrium is a family of strategies, which are health-dependent messages
(σi)i∈N , where each σi : H → S assigns a message to each health state, such that for
each i and hi, σi(hi) maximizes
U(hi; (σi)i∈N ) = E [Q(τ(σi(hi), (σj(h˜j))j =i), hi)− πi(σi(hi), (σj(h˜j))j =i)],
the expectation being taken with respect to the conditional distribution of h−i given hi,
over all messages s ∈ S. Thus, in a Bayesian equilibrium, each individual chooses her
message in such a way that average gain, taking both allocation and payment into account,
is as great as possible; here the average is taken over all the health configurations of the
remaining individuals, using the prior knowledge of its overall distribution. Clearly, a
strategy may be best against average behaviour of the others without being best against
any single configuration of the remaining individuals. On the other hand, if a strategy is
weakly dominant, being best in any configuration, then it is also best on the average and
therefore a Bayesian equilibrium.
For the following result, we need to specify the nature of the set H of possible health
states of each individual, which we assume to be the unit interval [0, 1]. Thus, we assume
that health can be assessed on a one-dimensional scale; however, we need not assume any
properties of this scale for our results, so that our assumption is much less restrictive that
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assuming e.g. QALY measurement of health states (as distinct from QALY measurement
of health improvement from treatment in any given health state, which we have assumed
above).
Proposition 2. Let M be a mechanism, and let σ be a Bayesian equilibrium such
that τ(σ(h)) ∈ tˆ(h) for each h ∈ HN . Assume that H = [0, 1] with h0 = 0, and that the
expected payment of a healthy individual E [π(σi(h0), (σj(h˜j))j =i)] is 0. Then
E [π(σi(hi), (σj(h˜j))j =i)] = csoc(hi)
for each i, where csoc(hi) is defined in (3).
Proof: Let i be arbitrary, and assume that the profile of health states h is given. Using
Myerson’s lemma (see e.g. Milgrom (2004), p.74) and writing
π∗(h) = π(σi(hi), (σj(h˜j))j =i),
τ∗(h) = τ(σi(hi), (σj(h˜j))j =i),
U∗(h0) = maxσˆiU(h0; (σˆi, (σj)j =i)),
we have that the expected payment of individual i has the form
E [π∗(h˜)|h˜i = hi] = − U∗(h0) + E [Q(τ∗(h˜)|h˜i = hi]
−
∫ hi
h0
(∑
ti∈T
Prob{τ∗(h˜) = ti|h˜i = s}Q′2(ti, s)
)
ds.
For hi = h0, the expression reduces to
E [π∗(h˜)|h˜i = h0] = −U∗(h0) + E [Q(τ∗(h˜)|h˜i = h0].
Here, the term U∗(h0) depends on the mechanism, but the second term on the right-hand
side depends only on the allocation rule, and since τ∗(h) ∈ tˆ(h) for all h, we have that
E [Q(τ∗(h˜)|hi = h0] = 0. We then obtain that
U∗(h0) = −E [π∗(h˜)|h˜i = h0] = 0
since expected payment in health state h0 is 0 by our assumptions. It follows now that
expected payment in any health state depends only on the allocation rule, and since this is
the same as in the VCG mechanism, we get the result.
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4. A simplified assessment formula
In the previous sections, we have developed a theoretical measure of the cost of less-
than-optimal use of the system for healthcare provision. It remains to connect this measure
to information which is available when carrying out the cost-effectiveness analysis, which
in most cases means before the drug has went into use, so that no empirical data on
prescription practice is available. Also, practical usefulness implies that the information
needed should relate to the treatment considered rather than, as has been the case above,
to the healthcare system as a whole and the totality of its treatments.
As we shall show in this section, if we are willing to accept some further simplifying
assumptions, then there is a rather simple way of assessing the moral hazard cost of a
treatment. First of all, we shall make an assumption of separability of treatments:
Assumption A1. There is a family A of interventions such that
(i) T = ∏α∈A Tα, and
(ii) Q(t, h) = ∑α∈A Q(tα, h), each h ∈ H and t = (tα)α∈A,
(iii) B = ∩α∈ABα for given subsets Bα of (Tα)N .
What is assumed here is that treatments which can be given to patients are fully
described by a (finite) menu of interventions; this first part of the assumption is therefore
not particularly restrictive. The second part of our assumption states that the total utility
gain of a treatment is the simple sum of the utility gains of the interventions of which the
treatment consists; this assumption is implicit in the traditional QALY approach to effect
measurement.
For ease of notation, we identify the treatment tα in the intervention α with the
treatment t = (0, . . . , 0, tα, 0, . . . , 0) writing Q(tα, h) for the utility gain obtained in
health state h by receiving only treatment tα from intervention α and nothing else.
The final part of Assumption 1 states that the set of feasible treatments can be seen as
consisting of feasible sets pertaining to each intervention. Once again this is a separability
assumption which is useful for assessment purposes but does not quite correspond to
reality, in particular if B is interpreted as a set of treatments which can be carried through
with a given budget. Here we reason as if the budget had already been split into separate
budgets for each intervention, which may work if the treatment plan is already known to
be overall welfare maximizing, but not in general.
The main advantage of our last assumptions is that they allow us to consider the
efficiency problem for each intervention separately rather than for the system of healthcare
provision as a whole. This property is formulated below as a lemma.
Lemma 1. Under A1, a treatment plan (tˆ1, . . . , tˆN ) is optimal given the profile of health
states h if and only if for each α ∈ A, the intervention profile (tˆ1α, . . . , tˆNα ) maximizes
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∑N
i=1 Q(t
i
α, h
i) on Bα.
Proof: Let h be arbitrary. It is trivial that if tˆ with tˆi = (tˆiα)α∈A for each i satisfies (1),
then tˆα = (tˆ1α, . . . , tˆ
N
α ) satisfies
tˆα ∈ argmax(t1α,...,tNα )∈Bα
N∑
i=1
Q(ti, hi). (4)
Suppose conversely that (4) is satisfied for each α ∈ A. Then for any treatment plan t we
have
∑N
i=1 Q(t
i
α, h
i) ≤ ∑Ni=1 Q(tˆiα, hi) for all α, and by (ii) of Assumption 1, we get
that
N∑
i=1
Q(ti, hi) =
N∑
i=1
∑
α∈A
Q(tiα, h
i) ≤
N∑
i=1
∑
α∈A
Q(tˆiα, h
i) =
N∑
i=1
Q(tˆi, hi),
showing that tˆ satisfies (1).
Using the result of Lemma 1, we may proceed towards the assessment of the cost
of moral hazard concentrating upon the intervention and neglecting repercussions on the
health system in general. Even so, the informational requirements of a cost computation
are beyond what can be met in practice, and we shall simplify further, assuming that the
treatment possibilities with the intervention considered reduce to a question of whether or
not to treat, and that there are well-defined health levels above which this treatment are
worthwhile for the patient and for the system, respectively.
Proposition 3. Assume A1, let individual health h be elements ofR, and let α ∈ A be
an intervention with Tα = {0, 1}. Assume that Q(t, ·) is nonincreasing for each t ∈ Tα
and that the health states of the individuals are independent with distribution function F
admitting a continuous density, and that the population is large (N going to ∞). Finally,
assume that the set Bα of feasible treatments is symmetric in N , so that (t1, . . . , tN ) ∈ Bα
implies that (tσ(1), . . . , tσ(N)) ∈ Bα for each permutation σ of N .
Then for each profile of health states h there is t ∈ tˆ(h) and a threshold h¯(h) such
that
tiα = 1 if and only if hi ≥ h¯(h), (5)
and
Csoc =
F (h¯(h))
F (h∗)
Q(1, h¯(h), (6)
where h∗ = inf{h |Q(1, h) > 0} is the lower limit of the health states for which treatment
matters.
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The statement of the proposition looks somewhat abstract, but the result is easily
interpreted: For each given profile of health states there is a threshold such that in the
optimal treatment profile, individuals should be given treatment if and only if their health
falls below this threshold (recall that for technical reasons we measure health as nonnegative
real numbers with 0 as perfect health). Moreover, the social loss due to moral hazard can
be evaluated as expected gain of treatment to an individual who is just below the treatment
threshold.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let the profile of health statesh be given, and let tˆ(h) be the
set of optimal treatment profiles at h. By Lemma 1, any intervention profile (tˆ1α, . . . , tˆ
N
α )
with tˆ ∈ tˆ(h) maximizes ∑Ni=1 Q(tiα, hi) on Bα. Assume now that there are individuals
i1 and i2 with hi1 < hi2 but such that tˆi1α = 1, tˆ
i2
α = 0. Then the treatment profile
obtained from (tˆ1α, . . . , tˆ
N
α ) by permuting i1 and i2 is feasible by symmetry of Bα, and
since Q(t, ·) is nonincreasing, we may assume that the optimal intervention profile has
tˆi1α = 0, tˆ
i2
α = 1. Consequently, the set of health states h such that tˆ
i
α = 1 for some i with
hi = h may be taken to be an interval [h∗,∞). This proves (5) and thereby the first part
of the proposition.
For the second part, we begin by evaluating the individual payment in the VCG
mechanism of individual i in health state hi, given that the true health state has been
reported by everyone. If tˆiα = 1, then withdrawing individual i will mean that a patient
with health state just above the threshold h¯ will get treatment instead of i, resulting in
a utility gain of Q(1, h¯), which would be the payment extracted from i in the VCG
mechanism. If individual i is not treated, then eliminating i has no effect on the utility of
the others, and the payment is zero.
By our assumption of large population and independence of health distribution,
we may assume that the treatment threshold is non-random, and since the payment
csoc(hi, h−i) depends on h−i only through h¯, we obtain Csoc by taking expectations
over hi, giving the desired formula (6).
The simplification obtained in Proposition 3 is substantial. Instead of assessing
payment formula in abstract mechanisms, we need only look for
(i) the treatment threshold,
(ii) the proportion of relevant patients whose health state is below this threshold, so
that they are entitled to treatment, and
(iii) the utility gain from treatment at the threshold.
These quantities can usually be assessed easily from available information, at least as
approximations. Clearly, the threshold as defined above presupposes a maximization of
total utility gains from treatment, whereas observable thresholds are determined by clinical
considerations; approximating theoretical concepts by real-life quantities determined in
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a different way is however a practice which is widespread in cost-effectiveness analysis.
The remaining quantities are in most cases found already in standard practice and therefore
easily accessible.
As can be seen from (6), the cost of moral hazard, as expressed by Csoc, is a product
of two factors, the first being the relative frequency of patients susceptible to moral hazard
which are actually treated, and the other one being the utility gain from treatment at the
limit. It should be noticed that by our assumption of quasi-linearity, this utility gain is
measured in money units, so that Q(1, h) represents the money equivalent of the QALY
gain which an individual in health state h derives from treatment. There is no standard
way of assigning money equivalents to QALY gains, but a commonly used method takes
as its point of departure the rules-of-thumb guiding the healthcare organizations when
adopting new interventions and treatments, according to which ¤ 30,000 is the limiting
value of obtaining a QALY; identifying marginal valuation by price, this can be taken as
an approximation of the money equivalent of a QALY.
For the evaluation of the first factor in (6), the frequency of treated individuals relative
to all individuals who may indulge in moral hazard, this frequency should reflect the
importance of moral hazard for the intervention considered. If, for example, the extent to
which patients may misrepresent true state of health is restricted to an interval, then the
quantity in the numerator reduces to F (h +) − F (h), giving a correspondingly lower
social cost of moral hazard.
5. An application: General versus individual reimbursement for drugs
In the preceding sections, we have developed a method for assessing the cost of
preventing moral hazard by voluntary means. The cost as found above expresses the total
payments to be extracted from the relevant patients (treated or not) in the cheapest possible
arrangement by which the welfare optimum is achieved when individuals choose what is
best for themselves given the rules of this arrangement. The question arises as to whether
this purely theoretical construction can shed light on practical matters; the purpose of this
section is to argue that indeed it can.
The obvious way in which to use the look at the relative importance of moral hazard
in any given case is to compare the cost of moral hazard as found above with the surplus
cost of treating patients which should not have been treated in the welfare optimum. If
the latter is small compared to the first one, then moral hazard is a minor problem –
doing away with it would cost much more than accepting the welfare loss caused by it –
whereas moral hazard becomes increasingly burdensome when the cost of over-treatment
gets larger compared to the cost of preventing moral hazard.
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Taking advantage of the results obtained in the previous section, we can get an
approximate numerical assessment of these quantities in cases where the available data
shed light on the distribution of benefits from treatment in the patient population.
Proposition 4. Let the cost δ of an intervention be given, and let G be the probability
distribution of the cost-effectiveness ratio of the intervention. If q∗ denotes the threshold for
cost-effectiveness ratios of socially acceptable interventions, then the cost of over-treating
patients is
MO = δ(1−G(q∗)),
whereas the cost of preventing moral hazard is
MP = G(q∗)δ
1
q∗
,
both measured per capita of potential patients, so that the relative importance of moral
hazard is
MO
MP
=
1−G(q∗)
G(q∗)
q∗ (5).
Proof: The expression for MO is a simple consequence of the definition, since 1−G(q∗)
is the fraction of patients for which treatment is socially suboptimal, but which are
nevertheless treated due to moral hazard. For MP , we use properties of the VCG
mechanism: In optimum, the payment of truth-telling patients who are not treated is
zero, since optimum remains unchanged if they are removed from the decision making;
for patients treated, the payment is the difference between total satisfaction of the others
when this patient is absent, and the actual total satisfaction of the others, and since removal
of a patient treated means that a previous untreated patient gets treatment, the satisfaction
of this patient must be at the threshold level of the cost-effectiveness ratio, meaning that
payment of a treated patient is δ/q∗. This gives us the expression for MP as stated in the
proposition.
It should be noticed that the quantity q∗ which occurs in the expressions of Proposition
4 is a constant which does not depend on the intervention considered. Therefore, we may
use the first factor on the right hand side in (5) as a measure of relative importance of moral
hazard,
ρM =
1−G(q∗)
G(q∗)
.
Comparing the values of ρM among different interventions we may then identify those
for which moral hazard is a problem (high values of ρM ) and consider whether some
additional arrangements, not necessarily voluntary, may be in order to reduce the impact
of moral hazard.
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It so happens that the probability distributionG used in Proposition 4 is often available,
at least approximately, as a result of the cost-effectiveness analysis of the intervention,
namely in the form of the so-called cost-effectivity acceptability curve introduced by van
Hout et al. (1994). Below we present an example of such a case.
The example considered is based on the work by Keiding et al. (2006), performing
a cost-effectiveness analysis of losartan versus atenolol for treatment of patients with
hypertension, based on patient data collected in the LIFE study (see Dahlo¨f et al., 2002).
The basic results of the analysis was a cost-effectiveness ratio of DKK 19,668 per QALY
when changing from atenolol to losartan if only direct cost is taken into consideration
(analysis performed from the point of view of the healthcare organization) and DKK
72,564 per QALY gained if all costs are included (society’s point of view).
Since the LIFE study included a very large number of patients, it was possible to carry
out extensive statistical analysis, including in particular construction of cost-effectiveness
acceptability curves, shown in Figure 1. Taking the informal rule-of-thumb for acceptable
interventions, namely DKK 300,000 per QALY gained, we have that the probability of a
patient with an effect of treatment which is below this threshold is 0.95 (all costs taken
into account). From this we get a measure of relative importance of moral hazard of
ρM =
0.05
0.95
= 0.0526.
Roughly speaking, disregarding a constant which does not depend on the intervention
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considered, the cost to society of accepting overconsumption is only about 5% of the
cost incurred if the socially optimal level of treatment was to be achieved by voluntary
decisions. In other words, accepting the moral hazard seems to be rather unimportant in
the case considered.
It should be mentioned that the computations are based on several simplifications, both
regarding the model (quasi-linear utilities, independence of treatments, selfish preferences
etc.) and the approximations used. In particular, the interpretation of the cost-effectiveness
acceptability curve as a probability density function of individual cost-effectiveness ratios
is not quite exact, cf. Fenwick, O’Brien and Briggs (2004). However, even with its inherent
shortcomings the method outlined presents a possibility for assessing the importance of
moral hazard in each individual case, supplementing the general impressions which hitherto
has been the basis for decision making.
6. Conclusion
In the present paper, we have developed a method for measuring the impact of moral
hazard in situations where a given intervention may be demanded by patients who are
not considered to benefit from this intervention to a sufficient extent to justify the cost of
treatment to society. Since the phenomenon to be measured has the form of a deviation from
an abstract (and typically not realized) social optimum, the measurement must necessarily
take a somewhat roundabout approach.
The approach chosen exploits some basic properties of mechanism design, starting
with the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which, if implemented, would result
in socially optimal decisions (under the – unfortunately rather restrictive – assumptions of
quasi-linear utility). The cost to the individuals of implementing the mechanism can be
seen as a cost of doing away with moral hazard, and this interpretation is reinforced by
the classical result from mechanism theory stating that any mechanism which achieves the
social optimum in Bayesian equilibrium will give the same expected cost to the participants.
With this notion of expected cost of moral hazard we can now assess the burden to society of
this phenomenon; it turns out that in cases usually treated in cost-effectiveness studies, the
equilibrium payments of the VCG mechanism can be assessed, at least up to a multiplicative
constant, using data which are often available from the clinical trial. This will make it
possible to compare interventions with regard to their vulnerability from moral hazard.
Needless to say, the approach is quite crude and many refinements are possible.
Also, the method should be considered from an axiomatic point of view, listing desirable
properties of any measure of the extent of moral hazard and characterizing this particular
one by some such properties. This will be a matter of future research.
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